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Introduction 
 
Michel Hansenne and Juan Somavia have been activist Directors-General in the style of 
predecessors such as Albert Thomas. They have fought to reorientate the ILO to make it 
more relevant in a changing world. In doing so, they have incurred strong criticism from 
those who believe that the changes introduced are wrong, and threaten the traditional role 
of the ILO. The following discussion charts their course and the associated debates2
MIchel Hansenne 
.  
Director General Hansenne spoke at the 1994 International Labour Conference about the 
need to understand and respond to the challenges raised by globalisation. Whilst the 
initiative was to lead directly to the implementation of the ILO Declaration on Social Justice 
for a Fair Globalisation in 2008 (via ‘The Fair Globalization’ report – see later), it was also a 
call to action in the ILO on a much broader front. After 1994, Hansenne led a significant re-
positioning of the ILO, most notably in terms of its traditional standards-setting role. At the 
heart of that repositioning was the 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights 
at Work. In Hansenne’s own words, the purpose of the repositioning was to achieve “more 
targeted standards for greater impact”.i
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Hansenne’s report to the 1997 International Labour Conference lays out the rationale for 
the Declaration. The argument for the Declaration has three strands, two positive, one 
negative. The positive arguments were, believed Hansenne, the acceptance by the ILO of a 
need to change, manifest in ILO activities after his 1994 speech, and the support for the ILO 
and standards-setting in other international agencies and events, including the  Copenhagen 
World Summit for Social Development The negative argument reflected Hansenne’s concern 
that the consensus binding the social partners to the traditional standard-setting approach 
was breaking down. He saw this breakdown in the tenor and quality of recent debates in the 
ILO and believed that a new consensus must be forged in the long term interests of the ILO. 
There was also, in his comments and in those of others, a concern about the effectiveness of 
traditional standards setting, to which we return below. 
There is in Hansenne’s speeches an explicit sense of globalization as an opportunity for the 
ILO. The ILO’s opportunity derives from the corollary of globalization – global governance. 
As global integrations proceeds, so will arise the need for effective global regulation, and in 
matters relating to labour and work, and what they mean for human dignity and rights, the 
ILO will reinforce and extend its role as the source of standards and, importantly, values. 
There is also another striking theme in his analysis, to the effect that standards have little 
purpose in themselves, but are a means to achieve desirable outcomes in work and life. It 
follows from this that the delivery of the standards message must be attuned to the 
prevailing economic and social circumstances. Traditional ways of thinking and acting with 
standards may no longer be appropriate. 
Hansenne believed that the ILO could work in two interdependent ways in order to 
maximise its impact. The first was “universal recognition of certain basic rights which should 
allow the social partners to claim their legitimate share in the development resulting from 
globalization -- which may therefore be viewed as the "social rules of the game of 
globalization”. Here, Hansenne takes a big stride away from traditional ILO thinking. 
Drawing on outcomes and discussions in the WTO, the OECD and in the World Summit for 
Social Development, particularly related to standards and the multilateral trade system, he 
develops further a view found in those discussions. This identifies ‘core’ labour standards as 
not only able to guarantee fundamental rights, but, also in a context in which “any fears that 
the application of these standards might influence the competitive positioning of these 
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countries in the context of liberalization are unfounded”.  Thus, we arrive at the notion of 
’core’ labour standards, which, when applied, simultaneously meet the requirements of the 
market and of human rights and dignity.  
The second way proposed “the setting up of an appropriate institutional framework to 
encourage States to use any benefits they might reap from globalization for achieving social 
progress”. In its simplest form, this involves the ILO working with member states to 
encourage them to integrate a social dimension into their economic strategies, particularly 
by the adherence to labour standards. The mechanisms for this are twofold, First, 
emulation, whereby the ILO supports technically in each state the extension of a social 
dimension from a minimum provision to something more, using ILO conventions as a 
means. Second, social labelling - the mechanism mooted here – later often described as ‘the 
overall social label’, and possibly based on a new convention – involves “an entirely 
voluntary and multilateral system for mutual recognition of social labels between States 
which could cover all or some of their export products, depending on the wishes of the 
States themselves” and also a variety of codes of conduct. Hansenne later backed away 
from this approach as concerns emerged within the ILO, especially on the part of developing 
countries that social labelling might be a route to protectionism.   
Hansenne proposed that standards should be better targeted for greater impact. The 
argument for better targeting was driven by emerging circumstances – the possibility that 
globalization would lead to an increase in the number of opportunities for standards setting; 
diminishing returns to standards may result from this; anyway, there are now other 
standard setting agencies also producing standards, which might lead to a ‘standards 
overload’ in member states. Hansenne was suggesting, therefore, that the traditional ILO 
process of standards setting had to change if ILO standards were to be ratified and 
observed. There was an internal political issue also in Hansenne’s mind. The ILO’s internal 
consensus around standard setting was beginning to fray at the edges as social partners 
began to question the substance of possible standards. Hence, the idea of fewer, better 
structured, targeted standards, with greater impact and support, was attractive to the ILO 
leadership. 
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How would a more streamlined standards setting model work? It would require a more 
strategic, and a less ad-hoc, approach to deciding what standards should be developed. This 
would require better consultation from the beginning with the social partners. Standards set 
in place should be assessed against their ‘value add’. The ILO should be “looking for 
standards with the highest ‘added value’”. The ILO might think of rationalising the existing 
standards, which sometimes overlap, or are out-dated. Existing standards might be 
‘codified’, providing an opportunity for standards involving general and important principles 
to be differentiated from those with a specific, narrower remit. The ILO should also 
recognise that specific standards might better be complemented or replaced by statements 
of principle (principles of responsibility), where the rate of change in work circumstances is 
so great that the prospect of multiple standards is faced. Standards should be better 
drafted, clearer in intended effect, not subject to significant, frequent amendment, and 
should be subject to review (and possible revision). The issue of evaluation of standards, 
and their possible revision, was an important feature of Hansenne’s refocusing of the 
standards-setting process. Here, and elsewhere in his thinking, it is possible to discern in the 
Director General a sympathy for performance management techniques, and for greater 
efficiency and effectiveness in the work of the ILO. Undoubtedly, this also reflected a 
concern about the inner workings of the ILO as an organization, and a recognition that a 
refocusing of the standards setting model would have important implications for the 
structure and operations of the ILO. 
Hansenne also suggested that standards-related discussion should be distanced from more 
general, topical discussion in the ILO. No doubt, this was intended to limit the ‘automatic’ 
response to consider a new standard whenever an issue was raised. Critics might interpret 
that distancing of standards setting from general discussion as down-playing of the 
standards setting process. His comments on recommendations and conventions might 
reinforce this concern. Conventions are, of course, promulgated to be translated into 
member states’ legal systems. They are intended to create legal obligations. 
Recommendations are simply that – non-mandatory suggestions about how member states 
should act in a particular context. Drawing on debate in the ILO over many years, Hansenne 
strongly endorsed the view that recommendations should no longer to the poor relations of 
conventions. He made a strong argument that recommendations are often as successful as 
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conventions, especially as the latter may not be ratified, and, if they are, may not be 
observed in practice. In making this argument, he risked the wrath of the workers ‘party’ in 
the ILO, which traditionally argued that conventions, even, those ungratified, were powerful 
signals to member states. The suggestion was that, normally, recommendations should 
become ‘autonomous’, that is, not dependent on a convention, but free-standing, and that 
their impact should be assessed  and promoted by regular reporting and follow-up activities 
in the ILO.  Hansenne was arguing for an up-grading of recommendations, not a down-
grading of conventions, but some would see this differently. 
This, then, was the blueprint for a refocused, modernized ILO. Its traditional core work - 
standards setting - would be restructured to become better targeted and evaluated, 
involving a clear distinction between ‘core’, fundamental standards, and others and an 
upgrading of the role of recommendations. Central to the proposal was a detailed follow-up 
to its adoption, including a system of regular reporting, including annual reviews of the 
Declaration and the production of a an annual global report on, in any given year, one of the 
fundamental rights.  
Notwithstanding the frankness of the debate and the range of issues raised by the social 
partners in the ILO’s internal debates,, in June 1998 the International Labour Conference 
adopted unanimously the Declaration at its 86th Session. The final wording of the 
Declaration is short and may be reduced to four key elementsii
(a) freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective 
bargaining; 
. First, the Declaration 
confirms that, by joining the ILO, and endorsing the principles set out in the ILO’s 
constitution and the declaration of Philadelphia, member states are bound by the principles 
related to four fundamental areas of rights, which are:  
(b) the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour; 
(c) the effective abolition of child labour; and 
(d) the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation. 
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Second, member states and the ILO, working together with other agencies, will 
support these fundamental rights: 
(a) by offering technical cooperation and advisory services to promote the 
ratification and implementation of the fundamental Conventions; 
(b) by assisting those Members not yet in a position to ratify some or all of these 
Conventions in their efforts to respect, to promote and to realize the principles 
concerning fundamental rights which are the subject of those Conventions;  
(c) by helping the Members in their efforts to create a climate for economic and 
social development. 
Third, the Declaration will be promoted by means of an annual ‘follow-up’ at member state 
level in cases where one or more of the four fundamental areas has not been addressed 
appropriately in terms of convention ratification, and an annual Global Report, analysing 
one of the fundamental rights each year. Fourth, labour standards should not be used for 
protectionist purposes. 
Criticisms of the Declaration 
What are the essential criticisms offered of the Declarationiii? First, there is the argument 
that, in practice, the Declaration shores up the market fundamentalist approach 
underpinning globalization. Its introduction undermined the debate around the inclusion of 
a social clause in trade deals by diverting attention and effort elsewhere (see Chapter 6 for 
further discussion). The four fundamental areas do not constitute a strategy to respond to 
globalization, as they are ‘negative rights’, already covered in most jurisdictions by common 
law. They are, runs this argument, areas to which member states can pay lip service without 
engaging seriously with more pressing and difficult issues. In any case, the Declaration 
simply seeks the promotion and resourcing of these areas, hoping that effective change 
follows from those activities. Finally, the Declaration creates a ceiling rather than a floor of 
standards, hamstringing the ILO’s ability to contribute to the creation of global justiceiv
  
. 
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This leads to a second important criticism. The traditional strength of the ILO standard 
setting system was the translation of conventions into law, creating legally-binding 
outcomes in member states. Critics bemoan the shift embodied in the Declaration from 
hard law to soft law – from enactment to promotion. That shift also moves he ILO debate 
significantly away from rights to broad principles, with the latter much more difficult to 
implement than rights associated with enforceable conventions. 
Third, the focus in the Declaration on ‘negative rights’ also marginalises important economic 
rights – employment security, pensions, maternity benefits etc – which traditionally would 
have had something akin to equal status with the Declaration’s ‘core’ rights. Underpinning 
this argument is a belief that the body of rights traditionally encompassed by the ILO was 
indivisible and provided a coherent framework for social justice. That coherence, and 
therefore the impact of the ILO, has been fundamentally compromised by the approach 
adopted in the Declaration.  
 
Fourth, the approach adopted by the Declaration permits responsibility for standards to 
devolve on a voluntarist basis to the private sector and other agencies. This argument has 
three strands. The first believes that this devolution, when coupled with the shift from hard 
to soft law, will be at best partial and much less effective in establishing standards than the 
traditional ILO process, Second, by devolving standards setting to the private sector on a 
voluntarist basis, the ILO is ceding important ground to initiatives such as Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR), which are top down, managerial strategies lacking many of the social 
justice dimensions of the traditional ILO model. Reference to ILO conventions in such 
initiatives is a poor alternative to traditional standards setting. Third, heterogeneous 
standard setting across multiple agencies and locations will be confused and will undermine 
the creation of a single, coherent and effective international standards framework. 
 
Fifth, the evidence for the success of the Declaration is not strong. The reporting process 
associated with the Declaration is self-serving and lightweight. Rigorous assessment would 
probably show the impact of the Declaration to be at best minimal.   
 
Sixth, the Declaration reflects a politically contingent approach by the ILO to the challenges 
it faced as a result of globalization. The sub-text here is that market fundamentalism had 
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eroded employer and government commitment to traditional tripartism and the ILO model. 
This explained the growing difficulty in establishing consensus around new conventions in 
the ILO. To preserve the ILO and reassert a new consensus, the ILO has eroded its focus on a 
coherent, universal framework of labour standards, leaving it in a weal position. Moreover, 
there is no guarantee that the new accommodation will be sustainable. The ILO may lose its 
status as primus inter pares in global labour standards setting and, in time, become 
irrelevant. In this argument, the mechanism adopted to save the ILO may be its nemesis. 
 
Alston’s (and Alston and Heenan’s) critique of the Declaration has drawn a detailed 
response from the senior ranks of the ILOv
 
. The core of Maupain’s counter-argument is that, 
first, the Declaration has been effective, that is, the supposed disadvantages associated with 
a move from the traditional ILO model to the framework imposed by the Declaration are 
shown empirically not to exist. Second, to the extent that constraints exist on the ILO after 
the adoption of the Declaration, those constraints were already a feature of the traditional 
model.  Moreover, the critique of the Declaration is rejected as polemical, methodologically 
unsound and, also unbalanced, for it takes the Declaration out of the broader operation of 
the ILO in which it functions. 
The counter attack is not only from within the ILO.  Langille, for example, is equally certain 
that the Alston critique is wrong. Langille offers a stinging rebuttal to Alston’s 2004 article. 
His thesis is that Alston’s critique missed the point. To start with, Alston failed to ask 
sensible questions, including fundamental, practical questions: were the changes right?  Did 
they benefit working people? Instead of engaging consistently and robustly with the 
changes and assessing their impact, Alston, argues Langille, failed to contrast what preceded 
the Declaration with what followed, thus failing to make an informed critical assessment. 
But that methodological failing was compounded, writes Langille, by the development of a 
quite erroneous thesis about the adverse effects of the Declaration, and all it entails, on 
what Alston identified to be the heart of the ILO, the traditional labour rights regime. 
Whence came that analytical error? Langille argues that its origins lie in the thesis, evident 
in both Alston and Standing, that the ILO has weakened its defence of labour rights as an 
effect of globalization and its ideology, neo-liberalism.  The Declaration was, in this view, a 
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way of subverting the ILO in line with the needs of globalization, whilst simultaneously 
making use of the ILO as a useful facade behind which globalization would prosper. For 
Langille, this was a “deeply shallow understanding” of the role of the ILO and the problems 
that it addresses. That understanding was flawed in many ways. To begin with, it 
misrepresented the status and role of the ILO and its focus on labour rights. By overstating 
the international significance and priority of the ILO and its rights activities, Alston’s thesis 
overstated the (adverse) impact of the Declaration. Moreover, suggests Langille, it 
misunderstood the position of the ILO before and after the Declaration; one of many 
institutions and agencies, actors and interventions addressing international labour law, 
important but not unique. Hence, the status of the ILO has not precipitately declined as an 
effect of the Declaration, nor has the international focus on international labour law been 
undermined, and nor has the range of agencies and institution concerned about labour law 
grown in ways that threaten the value of what the ILO does. 
 
Alston erred in many other ways, continues Langille. The Declaration did not weaken the ILO 
by downgrading the importance of labour rights, but improved its positioning in terms of 
emerging debates such as those around the Social Clause and WTO. The Declaration should 
not be judged against putative motivations attributed to people, but against what it 
achieves.  There was no weakening of the rights focus in the ILO by the introduction of the 
notion of principles, rather a legitimate shift from standards to rights in the grammar and 
focus of the ILO. In fact, Alston has misunderstood or misrepresented the rights-principles 
and enforcement-promotion relationships involved in the Declaration.  
 
Langille argues that, in multiple ways, the contrast provided by Alston between pre and post 
Declaration ILOs was wrong. For example, a move from precision in conventions to abroader 
statement of principles was necessary in order to make ILO measures telling across very 
different social and cultural contexts. Indeed, the Declaration involves an approach more 
likely to achieve labour rights in member states. It was also a move that could confront the 
growing crisis in the ILO around standards setting and supervision, a crisis manifested in 
declining rates of ratification and, difficulties in supervising compliance. Langille makes a 
stronger point still: Alston’s belief that in “detailed law and its ‘enforcement’” was to be 
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found the alternative to the Declaration approach is fundamentally wrong, for that was not 
how the ILO had traditionally achieved success. Enforcement was never the key weapon at 
the ILO’s disposal. Engagement, promotion and persuasion were the mainstays of the IO 
armoury. 
Langille also questions asks why Alston did not address the coherence, or otherwise, of the 
idea of core labour rights, on which the Declaration rests. Here lies the crux of Langille’s 
critique. At the risk of over-simplifying a complex argument, Langille accuses Alston of failing 
to understand the purpose of the Declaration in its goal – and the ILO’s traditional goal - to 
support the establishment of both procedural rights and substantive standards, that is, 
mechanisms whereby outcomes are defined, and the ‘floor’ of outcomes that is desirable. In 
particular, the definition of core ‘rights’ in the Declaration is conceptually coherent and 
central to the sustaining of employee voice in the work context. The definition of these 
particular core rights in the Declaration, argues Langille, also  promotes respect for non-core 
rights, for substantive rights follow the successful implementation of procedural rights. 
  
The debate about the ILO’s refocusing around the Declaration is bitter. On the face of 
things, it might look like there are some points of contact between the two positions, but 
closer examination suggests that there is a battle joined for the future of the ILO as an 
organisation and for effective labour standards in which the Declaration is point of 
engagement. We can consider the debate in terms of three issues – the rationale for action, 
the action adopted, and the effect and effectiveness of the action. Everyone agrees that 
there was a need for action, but there are differences on substance and emphasis in the 
explanation of that need. Hansenne’s rationale for change is quite measured. The challenge 
of globalization must be addressed, the social partners in the ILO understand this, external 
agencies are promoting the need for an effective ILO response, and, in any case, the internal 
consensus in the ILO needs to be reconstituted if labour standards are to play a role in the 
new global economy. The critics’ analysis agrees that globalization must be engaged. 
However, the ILO has, according to this argument, arrived at this conclusion late in the day 
after a long period of uncertainty about its role and effectiveness. The manner of its arrival 
at the need for action has not only weakened the resolve of the ILO to act in traditional 
defence of labour standards, but also brought the ILO substantially in line with market 
fundamentalist perspectives. The ILO is in peril as a result.  
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Somavia: Extending the Agenda 
The Chilean, Juan Somavia, was elected to serve as Director General in 1998, his term 
beginning in early 1999. He had already played an important role as Chair of the Preparatory 
Committee for the Copenhagen World Summit. It was in the Copenhagen Summit that ‘core’ 
labour standards were clearly identified. It is from this background that Somavia assumed 
the mantle of Albert Thomas. He moved the ILO forward on the track begun at the 
Copenhagen Summit, and implemented by his predecessor, whilst also making his own mark 
on the process. The ‘Fair Globalization’ report was produced on his watch, and whilst other 
work was carried out in the ILO by a Working Party on the Social Dimensions of 
Globalization. In turn, this resulted in the 2008 Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair 
Globalization. Much of this activity was in line with the conclusions drawn in Copenhagen. 
Somavia’s openness to ILO co-operation with other international agencies reflected a theme 
in the Copenhagen final report as does his ‘Decent Work’ agenda, which also drew on ILO 
traditions. Somavia also strove to improve the accountability of the ILO in terms of its 
strategic direction and the measurement and reporting to outcomes against strategic goals.  
 
Decent Work: Somavia’s Imprint on the ILO 
In a report to the ILC in 1999, Somavia described the ILO as: “the global reference point for 
knowledge on employment and labour issues; the centre for normative action in the world 
of work; a platform for international debate and negotiation on social policy; and a source 
of services for advocacy, information and policy formulation......the ILO must once again 
display its historic capacity for adaptation, renewal and change”vi
 
. That capacity required, 
argued Somavia, the setting of priorities and meant that “that focus, excellence and 
effectiveness must guide the management culture of the house”. Subsequently, he also 
recognised that the 1998 Declaration provided the “universal floor”, embodied in the 
fundamental principles and rights expressed in the core Conventions 
12 
 
12 
 
Having established the status of the ILO, the need for priorities and for excellence, Somavia 
made a remarkable leap in reducing the vision and role of the ILO to one pithy statement 
“The primary goal of the ILO today is to promote opportunities for women and men to 
obtain decent and productive work, in conditions of freedom, equity, security and human 
dignity”. From this emerged the organising principle for the ILO in the post1999 period - 
Decent Work – and its role as epicentre of the four strategic objectives of the ILOvii
 
. Rarely 
has an international agency embraced private sector management thinking so 
wholeheartedly. 
The concept of Decent Work was much elaborated after Somavia introduced it in 1999viii
 
. 
Much of the discussion sought to position Decent Work as, simultaneously, a reflection of 
ILO traditions and a modernization to meet a new a different world. A key point was that 
the traditional ILO approach of standards setting was too much driven by developed world 
country agendas. Even in its ‘development phase’ in the 1960s to 1980s, when development 
issues were explicitly given a central role in ILO thinking, that traditional ILO approach was 
still powerful, and unbalancing in its effects on the ILO. Decent Work, as a unity of the four 
strategic objectives, was able to deal with diversity in country experience more effectively, 
and therefore able to position the ILO in more balanced fashion across the needs of its 
constituents. It was also understood as universal. All people should enjoy decent work 
conditions and experience. The four strategic objectives encompass, in their unity, the key 
facets of Decent Work. Relativism will apply – decent work in Bangladesh may be configured 
differently from decent work in Sweden, and different again in Liberia – but it will have a 
clear meaning in each context. Moreover, each will be a site in which particular projects, 
capacity building and technical assistance can be applied.  
The four strategic objectives define the breadth of involvement on the part of the ILO 
proposed by the Decent Work paradigm. Rights at work respond to the traditional standards 
setting activities of the ILO. Decent employment and income captures the ILO’s long-
standing commitment to macroeconomic policy, which promotes full employment and 
rewarding work opportunities. The emphasis on social protection reflects the ILO’s 
engagement with social policy in parallel with macroeconomic policy. Social dialogue is 
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simultaneously at the heart of the ILO process and, also, a commitment to strong 
democratic principles and institutions in and beyond work. 
 
A key theme in Somavia’s thinking addresses the preparedness of the ILO to deliver a 
Decent Work workplan. As he put it: 
  it has traditionally been difficult to develop a capacity for integrated 
thinking, cooperation among programmes and a sense of teamwork 
within the Office. This has also been true of our constituents, 
who have tended to pick and choose their preferences from the ILO 
menu. This has regularly come to the fore in the programme and 
budget debates.....I honestly believe that a fragmented ILO has no future. We 
need to change old habits. 
One senses frustration in Somavia about the internal performance of the ILO and, also about 
the level and quality of commitment of the social partners to a strong and effective ILO. His 
is, publicly, a more striking critique of the ILO than that of Hansenne, yet they share much in 
common. The structure of the ILO, the configuration and performance of staff and 
programmes, the quality of thinking and representativity of the social partners, and the 
quality of strategic thinking uniting the whole are central to the assessments made by both. 
 
The implementation of Decent Work was entrusted in the first instance to the Decent Work 
Pilot Programme (DWPP) which oversaw pilots in eight countries seeking to integrate 
Decent Work into national policy-making by, in particular, strengthening capacity buildingix. 
Subsequently, a variety of related programmes were introduced, including, in 2002, pilot 
projects looking to integrate Decent Work into poverty reduction strategies (the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers process – PRSP)x
 . 
. Other, parallel initiatives were commenced 
with Brazil, Argentina and some Asian region countries. In 2005, the idea of Decent Work 
Country Programmes was launched, involving national programmes with high levels of 
integration of Decent Work priorities. 
By the time the 2006-2007 ILO budget was announced, Decent Work Country Programmes 
(DWCP) were to be its main delivery vehiclesxi. In line with the rationalization of 
programmes and budgets discussed below, a DWCP was to be the operational framework 
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for ILO activities in any country. The elements determining a DCWP were a clear problem 
analysis, leading to the identification of clear priorities which reflected national priorities, 
those of the social partners and other agencies operating in the country. Technical 
assistance needs were also identified at this nstage. Short (2 year) and medium term (4-6 
year) goals were set, associated with an implementation plan that defined goals and their 
evaluation. Monitoring and evaluation permitted adjustment of, and a check on, the impact 
of the programme. At the heart of each country programme were the ILO’s four strategic 
objectives, technical assistance and monitoring and evaluation. A first-time reader of the 
DWCP material from the ILO would understand the ILO’s intervention strategy as a broad 
approach to labour and social issues in a given country. Whilst rights at work remained one 
of the four strategic objectives underpinning Decent Work, that reader would have had to 
search very hard to discover the remnants of the traditional ILO focus on standard setting. 
The DCWP, as the primary delivery vehicle for the ILO budget, indicated clearly how far the 
reform process begun in 1994 had taken the ILO. By 2008, DWCPs were in place in 31 
member states, with another 53 in preparation. 
 
The status of Decent Work in ILO strategy brings to life the debates rehearsed in Chapter 5 
around the 1998 Declaration. Langille’s critique of Alston included pragmatic questions 
about the impact of the Declaration and the shift to core rights. Will Decent Work-related 
programmes bring about real improvement in people’s lives? Are they a good thing? Do 
they stand the ILO in good stead for the future? Empirically, there is some evidence that the 
programmes are successful. They are certainly growing in number and extent. We can also 
reflect on the likely advantages of an integrated, country-based programme in which ILO 
activities are associated closely with national policy setting and the activities of other 
international agencies.  Improved monitoring and evaluation designed to upgrade 
performance may well conserve scarce resources. There is also a strong continuity between 
the purpose the 1998 Declaration and the development of the Decent Work agenda. The 
post-1994 change process is purposely consolidated in Decent Work.   
 
Fair Globalization 
In June, 2008, the ILC adopted the Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization 
(Declaration 2008)xii. This was a direct effect of the follow up undertaken after the ‘Fair 
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Globalization’ report, and of the activities of the Working Party on the Social Dimensions of 
Globalizationxiii
The Declaration 2008 positioned the ILO as the pretender to the pre-eminent role in the 
creation of global social justice and a fair globalization. It also positioned the Decent Work 
agenda as the key delivery mechanism to achieve those ends. It located Decent Work in the 
four strategic objectives of the ILO (employment, social protection, social dialogue and 
international labour standards) and as central to the design and implementation of the 
Strategic Policy Framework (2010-1015). A key argument made by Somavia was that the 
four objectives are indivisible, that is, each is vital for the achievement of the others. The ILO 
is the only international institution commanding the principles and values, the track record 
and the technical capacities able to achieve these objectives.  The implementation of the 
Declaration 2008 was in line with the implementation of the 1998 Declaration. The follow 
up process envisaged the ILO putting in place organisationally resources and capacities able 
to support members as they implemented the Declaration 2008’s principles. Support for 
member states would be in terms of improved sand focused, technical assistance, good 
research provision and effective evaluation of the Declaration 2008 by the ILC. 
. It also draws significantly on other initiatives, including the Copenhagen 
Social Summit. Its constitutional status within the ILO is as one of three supreme statements 
of ILO principles and values. The other two are the Declaration of Philadelphia (1944) and 
the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (1998). 
 
The Declaration 2008 also signals the moving on of the ILO from the politics of the 1998 
Declaration. The 1998 Declaration was a repositioning or refocusing exercise, allowing the 
ILO to identify fundamental areas of action – a process of prioritization. It also reaffirmed 
strongly the promotion and encouragement model, whilst distancing the ILO to some extent 
(at least) from a tradition standard-setting focus. The two processes – prioritization and 
distancing – provided the ‘space’ in which, from 1999, the four strategic objectives could be 
defined, and for the broader mandate for Social Justice to be assumed. Decent Work 
provides the framework for meeting the demands of that mandate. 
 
The ILO: Strategy and Performance 
Somavia came to office with a clear view that the performance of the ILO might be 
improved. In Chapter 4, we indicated his concerns about the inward-looking nature of the 
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ILO. He saw the ILO as “inward looking, preoccupied with procedure, relatively slow in 
response, and having a style of expression that deters all but the most enthusiastic from 
discovering our ideas”. He also thought it poorly focused in terms of outputs and outcomes. 
Hence, immediately upon taking up his position, he set in train a change process involving 
strong tripartite consensus around ILO priorities, budget reallocations and a work 
programme to meet those priorities, and new management structures and programme 
activitiesxiv
• Promote and realize standards and fundamental principles and rights at 
work 
. For the initial period (2002-2005), tripartite consensus was reached around the 
four strategic objectives, which were to: 
• Create greater opportunities for women and men to secure decent 
employment and income 
• Enhance the coverage and effectiveness of social protection for all  
• Strengthen tripartism and social dialogue 
 
Each was refined by subsets of operational objectives and a statement of ILO responses to 
those objectives. Subsequent reporting was provided in terms of those objectives. Thos 
same strategic objectives were included in the Strategic Policy Framework (SPF) for 2010-
2015, which emphasised an explicitly outcomes-based approach to ILO activitiesxv
 
. The SPF 
set out the objectives for the ILO in a measurable, results-based manner. Its design sought 
to be both stable and flexible, able to show changing performance over time, yet also 
allowing for adaptation in the work programme. The Director General’s annual reports were 
also structured in terms of strategic objectives, outputs and outcomes, and measurement of 
targets reached (or not). Integration and cross cutting themes were important, with cross-
cutting activities including emphases on policy integration, gender equality, research and 
training, and external relations and partnerships. 
Somavia’s management reforms were significant and inevitably challenged many ILO staff 
members. Thirty nine major programmes were reorganised into the four strategic objectives 
in a substantial budget and programme realignment. A new Senior Management Team was 
installed. The technical sectors within the ILO were restructured internally. Operational 
17 
 
17 
 
objectives were reviewed and revised and cost-benefit measures and performance 
measurement were introduced. Monitoring, evaluation and reporting was revised and made 
more responsive to budget process requirements. Eight international focus (InFocus) 
programmes linked to the strategic objectives were identified. Building on elements in the 
present work of the Office, they cut across existing departmental boundaries to concentrate 
a critical mass of research and technical cooperation in areas such as strengthening social 
dialogue, the elimination of child labour, and crisis response and reconstruction. The social 
partners broadly supported these reforms. In many ways, they saw them as a necessary 
complement to the refocusing of the ILO in the 1990s. Some staff members were also 
comfortable with change in the organisation. For them, modernization of the ILO was 
overdue, and a focus on performance was welcome.  
 
The Counter View 
There is a counterview, put most eloquently and forcefully by Standing (Standing 2008). To 
start, leadership in the ILO was weakened after 1999 by the appointment to senior and line 
management positions of ‘faction’ members – employers and trade unionists. Roles were 
therefore “muddied” as appointees struggled to match their technical and ‘political’ 
responsibilities. Then, the transition to a new Director General did little or nothing to 
address the fundamental question of representativity. The union and employer 
organisations within the ILO, argues Standing, represent at best a small part of their 
potential global constituency. Moreover, they have a stranglehold over their own fiefdoms 
within the ILO and are unlikely to want to give up that power. There is no willingness to 
think and act more widely about the contemporary structure of work and what that might 
mean in terms of representation in the ILO. The abolition of the Industrial Relations 
Department in 1999 seriously reduced the focus on labour standards, allowing the much 
vaguer and “vacuous” notion of social dialogue to prevail. Budgets for the traditional 
standards work were squeezed by other expenditures (with Standing estimating, for 
example, that work on the ‘Fair Globalization’ report may have cost up to US$20 million). 
Standard setting has also been undermined by increased numbers of staff with no 
experience of standards and the ILO process (including the highest levels of leadership). The 
new budget model introduced a tendency to “short-termism”, for it runs on a two year 
cycle.  
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This is a strong attack on structure of the ILO post 1999, and, it must be said, very much 
directed at the strategic vision of successive Director Generals. It is also simply one aspect of 
a far broader attack on the current ILO by Standing, who argues that the flawed strategic 
direction chosen by the ILO after 1994 has compounded problems already in place at the 
time of Hansenne’s election. We return to this attack in Chapter 8. For now, we might 
reflect on the size of the challenge facing Somavia when he began his reorganization of the 
ILO. The ILO is a large, complex, ponderous international ‘political’ bureaucracy, multi-sited, 
highly formal, hierarchical, and multicultural. Its staff are diverse, varying from essentially 
political appointments to highly-skilled and highly-specialised technical staff, many with 
international reputations in their fields of expertise. There is, particularly in the specialist 
groups, a strong ethos of guardianship of their respective areas of responsibility and of ILO 
traditions. Quality outputs matter, but, also, so does the responsibility of meeting the 
requirements of a diverse audience, especially amongst the social partners. Much as is the 
case with a national civil service, which develops its mechanisms and manner of expression 
to match its advisory role to government, so the specialist ‘officials’ of the ILO measure their 
outputs. Its epistemic community may well have contributed to the successful survival of 
the ILO, but it is also often defensive and, as Somavia put it, inward looking, regulation-
focused and unapproachable. As one thwarted senior staff member loyal to the post 1994 
change process put it in the early 2000s:  “Achieving change here is very difficult......there is 
obstruction all the way......organizational politics here are poisonous”xvi
 
. 
This context is important when we consider the scope of change envisaged by Hansenne 
and Somavia. Putting to one side the rights and wrongs of the ILO’s refocusing post 1994, 
consensus for that refocusing was achieved amongst the social partners and the Directors 
General received a mandate for change. They were faced with a major external challenge as 
they repositioned the ILO in the new global order, but the external challenge was matched 
by an equally difficult internal challenge, for some ILO staffers were angered by what they 
saw as a misdirection of the ILO and, therefore, a potential threat to the ILO’s future. The 
fact that the repositioning caused internal reorganization of the ILO, which shifted 
boundaries, changed responsibilities and had significant effects on the career prospects of 
many staff members should not be forgotten. We should take care when judging the need 
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for, and impact of, Somavia’s organizational and managerial reforms, and when we consider 
the competing interpretations of those reforms, for there are many interests in play. 
 
 
 
The Somavia Legacy 
Somavia is the first non-developed nation Director General in the ILO’s history. He had little 
previous history with the ILO before he was elected. He is not labour specialist but, rather, 
an international diplomat with a strong interest in development and social justice. He had 
no grounding in the pre-1994 period, that period which Langille sees as romanticised by 
those with a narrow labour law perspective on the ILO.  The links between his own thinking 
and the changes introduced by Hansenne were explicitly recognized in the latter’s 
references to the outcome of the Copenhagen Social Summit, a summit in which Somavia 
had played a leading role. We must assume that Somavia’s election reflected broad comfort 
with his track record and policy preferences. In the context of the post-1994 changes, 
Somavia had an unequivocal mandate to continue the reform process. Any surprise that he 
did would be contrary. A performance review might well agree that he had operated in the 
manner expected at the time of appointment, and probably met his key performance 
indicators. All three social partners issued strongly worded statements of support for him 
and his programmes when he was re-elected in 2003. He was, undoubtedly, seen as an 
inappropriate appointment or threat by some ILO staffxvii
 
. Following his appointment, 
factional commentary emerged within the organisation around his suitability for the job, his 
senior staff appointments and, inevitably the changes in priority and management that he 
introduced. This is not surprising, nor is the concern expressed by some staff members 
about the ‘cult of the individual’ sometimes attributed to Somavia. Visible leadership often 
attracts such commentaries. 
Weighing up the views surrounding Somavia’s appointment and subsequent actions, it is fair 
to conclude that his was an appointment well-fitted to the task bequeathed to him by 
Hansenne. Somavia has extended the change process strategically and organizationally, and 
with success, and has undoubtedly placed the ILO more firmly in the public gaze and in the 
deliberations of other international agencies. 
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